Genres and Gender of Protest in Russia's Petrostate is a scholarly article which connects protest, gender, and the discourse around petrostate economics to build the argument that Russia's reliance on its hydrocarbon economy has created a "superfluous" class, particularly in the major cities. This class of people, highly educated and "materially satisfied," represent those who have been left out of the hydrocarbon economy, and are therefore irrelevant to Putin's regime. They have missed out on the benefits of oil and gas exports, and have not seen the level of investment in their livelihoods as have the 1% who are directly involved in the oil and gas industries.

A petrostate is a nation with an economy based on oil and gas exports to increase economic revenues and GDP. In these states, wealth stems not from the labor and knowledge of the people, but from resources that the state can extract. Taxes are less relevant to the state than resource revenues, and so the average person contributes little to the development of the state. The government is highly involved in extraction, with state control of certain sectors or companies. For example in Russia, Transneft is state-owned and controls all oil exports, and Gazprom is a state-owned firm that exports gas. Petrostates are associated with the "oil curse." States like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Venezuela, and Russia, depend heavily on their hydrocarbon economies, which leads to lower levels of investment in human capital and women's rights. This cyclical structure is as follows: reliance on resources leads to less investment in human capital, which leads to less economic development, which then leads back to a heavier reliance on resources. In this way, it is difficult to overcome the oil curse and the stigma of being a petrostate. John McCain famously referred to Russia as a "gas station masquerading as a country," due to its relatively low investments in other sectors of the economy, education, and healthcare, or allowance of minority rights, women's rights, and electoral rights.

The essence of this article is the superfluity of the creative class in Russia, which is a consequence of shortcomings in alternative investments. Advertising and marketing staff, intellectuals such as professors, lawyers, and artists, all feel that the Putin regime does not reflect their interests, and only internalize the interests of the 1% that engage in the hydrocarbon economy. This group is educated, but unnecessary, so they do not see benefits from their education. Additionally, their education allows for deep pondering regarding their place in Putin's Russia, of which they feel they have none. For years, they had tacitly agreed to a metaphorical "deal" in which they go along with Putin's rule in the hope that things will get better, Russia's economy will diversify, or that some of the oil and gas money will trickle down and improve Russian human infrastructure. However in 2012, with clear electoral interference, they decided that this could not continue, and took to the streets.

As the world moves towards climate consciousness, Russia faces a growing challenge. They are forced to count on a slow and gradual shift towards clean energy sources, and will do whatever is necessary to stall these changes, likely including disinformation campaigns directed at the United States and Western Europe. With regard to gender equality, Russia's hydrocarbon economy has limited the role for women, who make up a small percentage of business executives and an even smaller percentage of oil and gas blue collar workers, so not only do they face the consequences of the oil curse, but they are left out of the benefits even more so than men. Oil is both a blessing and a curse, but Norway has demonstrated that deep investment in human capital including in education and healthcare can overcome the curse and lead to gender equality and more equal society overall.